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. 2012 Nov;15(11):1300-1307.
doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2012.01853.x. Epub 2012 Aug 22.

VSports - How to assemble a beneficial microbiome in three easy steps

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How to assemble a beneficial microbiome in three easy steps

István Scheuring et al. Ecol Lett. 2012 Nov.

Abstract

There is great interest in explaining how beneficial microbiomes are assembled. Antibiotic-producing microbiomes are arguably the most abundant class of beneficial microbiome in nature, having been found on corals, arthropods, molluscs, vertebrates and plant rhizospheres. An exemplar is the attine ants, which cultivate a fungus for food and host a cuticular microbiome that releases antibiotics to defend the fungus from parasites. One explanation posits long-term vertical transmission of Pseudonocardia bacteria, which (somehow) evolve new compounds in arms-race fashion against parasites VSports手机版. Alternatively, attines (somehow) selectively recruit multiple, non-coevolved actinobacterial genera from the soil, enabling a 'multi-drug' strategy against parasites. We reconcile the models by showing that when hosts fuel interference competition by providing abundant resources, the interference competition favours the recruitment of antibiotic-producing (and -resistant) bacteria. This partner-choice mechanism is more effective when at least one actinobacterial symbiont is vertically transmitted or has a high immigration rate, as in disease-suppressive soils. .

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Figures

Figure 1
Figure 1
The emergence of bistability as host resource levels Is increase (eqn 3). The higher the host resource input rate Is, the steeper the Pathogen's nullcline (grey, red online) (A: Is= 5; B: Is= 7; C: Is= 11; black is the Beneficial's nullcline). The system becomes bistable above a critical Is value. Solid dots indicate stable fixed points, and the empty dot indicates the unstable fixed point (rp= 2.5, rb= 2, α = 0.2, k = 1, Ac= 0.1). The antibiotic effect of beneficials on pathogens is scaled by formula image, which is a function of formula image. Increasing Is increases growth rates of all bacteria but also allows greater antibiotic production, leading to suppression of Pathogens.
Figure 2
Figure 2
The effect of host resource Is, proportion of resources diverted to antibiotics α, and antibiotic effectiveness Ac on the Beneficial's domain of attraction. (a) The domain (shaded triangle) is approximated as Tb= pu/[2 (pu + bu)] if 0 < pu, bu < 1, else Tb= 0 and P wins (parameters as Fig. 1). The dashed black curve within the shaded triangle marks the true upper boundary of the Beneficial's domain. (b) The relative domain of attraction (Tb/Ttot) as a function of α and Is. Increasing α cannot grow the domain above zero when Is is low, because antibiotic production is insufficient. The black line indicates the optimal α for different Is. (c) The relative domain of attraction is weakly sensitive to antibiotic effectiveness Ac (= 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, l-to-r), suggesting that Pathogen resistance evolution has little effect.
Figure 3
Figure 3
A higher Beneficial immigration rate Ib promotes fixation of Beneficials in a new microbiome in the absence of vertical transmission. Grey (red online) lines denote different community trajectories as Ib changes from 0 to 0.5. The dashed line is the separatrix dividing the two qualitatively different motions denoted by the blue arrows. The open dot is the unstable fixed point, and black dots are the fixed points of the system, which depend on the immigration rate. Is= 5, rp = 2.5, rb= 2, α = 0.2, k= 1, Ip= 0.1, Ac= 0.1.

References

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